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THE ROLE OF THE INDEPENDENT 
REGULATORY AGENCY IN CANADA
H. N. Janisch*
To complain of the age we live in, to murmur at the present possessors of 
power, to lament the past, to conceive extravagant hopes for the future, are 
the common disposition of the greatest part o f mankind.
Edmund Burke
I. INTRODUCTION
As the focus of this paper will be pragmatic rather than theoreti­
cal, it would be well, right at the outset, to identify some current 
issues illustrative of the confused state of our thinking on the role of 
the independent regulatory agency in Canada.
The Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications 
Commission has provided a number of such issues and five - com­
mercial deletion, Manitoba cable television, pay television, and the 
inquiry into the C.B.C. - have been selected for examination.
In an attempt to mitigate the economic impact of U.S. tele­
vision signals received in Canada via cable, the Commission made 
the random deletion of commercial messages from such signals a 
condition of licence for some cable television operators. This policy 
was strongly opposed by American border stations and it became a 
major irritant in Canada-U.S. relations. Despite a great deal of 
criticism, and a legal challenge which by the end of last year was 
headed into the Supreme Court of Canada, the Commission held 
firm. In the meantime, as part of broader negotiations, Ottawa 
agreed to suspend commercial deletion.1 The problem then was 
how this political accommodation was to be implemented in view of 
the Commission’s independent status.
As Geoffrey Stevens wrote on January 14, 1977:
Important as the principle o f commercial deletion is to the C.R.T.C. it may 
agree to accept the moratorium negotiated between Canada and the 
United States. The Commission is already challenging an agreement 
between the federal Government and Manitoba which gives the province 
the right to own the hardware used to distribute television programs. The 
C.R.T.C. may decide that discretion is the better part o f valor - that one fight 
with the Government at a time is quite enough .2
* Professor o f Law at Dalhousie University.
1 See ‘‘Will Canada propose a quid pro quo? Hot signals at U.S. T.V. border”, 
Financial Post, October 2, 1976.
2 “They call it piracy” . Globe and Mail, January 14, 1977. And see “ Don’t tell the 
Court", ibid., January 13, 1977.
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A week later the Commission announced that it was indeed 
suspending its commercial deletion policy.
As Stevens indicated the Commission was also embroiled in a 
dispute with the Department of Communications over an agreement 
entered into between the Department and the Province of Manitoba 
which would undermine a long established Commission policy on 
the ownership of cable hardware. That policy has been firmly resist­
ed by both Manitoba and Saskatchewan which have government 
owned telephone systems capable of providing a province-wide 
infrastructure if only the Commission would relax its ownership 
requirements. Commission Chairman Harry Boyle was soon to make 
it clear that he was not convinced that the agreement was in any way 
binding on the Commission.3
The Commission’s position was made public at the end of 1976, 
and it showed that it was prepared to take a tougher stand here than 
with regard to commercial deletion.
While the Commission was not a party to the Agreement and is not legally 
hound bv it. the Commission would find it helpful in its deliberations on 
future applications for cable television licences in Manitoba, to receive 
comments on the terms and scope of the Agreement from applicants and 
other interested parties, including the parties to the agreement. In particu­
lar the Commission would appreciate a fuller understanding of the agree­
ment as it relates to the Commission's concern that licensees exercise effec­
tive control over their cable television undertakings . . . .  4
Another major point of conflict between the Commission and 
the Department has been over pay television. In June, 1975 the Com­
mission held hearings on pay television and its Public Announce­
ment of December 16, 1975, concluded that “ . . .  it is premature to 
introduce a comprehensive pay television service into Canada at this 
time” .
In a speech to the Canadian Cable Television Association on 
June 2,1976 the Honourable Jeanne Sauvé, Minister of Communica­
tions, stated:
The establishment of pay television service on a large scale is inevitable . . .
As a result, and in order to encourage you and other interest groups to up­
date the submissions you placed before the C.R.T.C. last June - and to 
comment on what 1 have said today - I have asked the C.R.T.C. to call for 
and receive submissions from the public until September first of this year on 
the structural development of pay T.V.
3 "C.R.T.C. seeking legal opinion on status o f Ottawa-Manitoba cable accord” . 
Globe and Mail, November 23, 1976. The Canadian Cable Television Association 
was strongly critical o f the agreement which it condemned as political interfer­
ence in the regulatory process. The protest was dismissed as “ . . .  an exaggerated 
reaction to a normal function of a minister done within the limits o f authority” . 
“ Sauvé attacks C.C.T.A.’s criticism", ibid., December 22, 1976.
4 C.R.T.C. Public Notice, December 30, 1976, pp. 2-3 (Emphasis added).
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The Consumers’ Association of Canada, for one, was amazed 
how the Minister could seek, without any new evidence, to reverse 
. the considered policy position of the C.R.T.C., an independent 
and expert regulatory tribunal, in the remarkably short time of some 
5 months.” It went on to invite the Minister to appear personally 
before the Commission “ . . .  to explain why you consider that the 
C.R.T.C. should change its policy on pay television.” 5
Prime Minister Trudeau’s request to the C.R.T.C. to inquire into 
allegations of pro-separatist bias in the C.B.C. b has raised a number 
of most profound questions as to the role of the Commission and its 
relationship to government. As the inquiry is still under way, it 
would be premature to make more than a preliminary, tentative 
assessment. However, it is possible to consider one decision which 
has already been made - the decision to go ahead with the inquiry at 
all. Certainly, it was under no specific legal obligation to do so, 
although its regulatory mandate does speak of a broadcasting 
system one of whose purposes is to “ safeguard, enrich and 
strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of 
Canada.”
Geoffrey Stevens, for example, was initially convinced that the 
Commission should have refused to become involved in any inquiry 
at all, and he condemned its cooperation in no uncertain terms.
In the view of the Liberal Government, the C.R.T.C. failed to police the 
French network adequately. Otherwise, the Prime Minister would not have 
told Mr. Boyle to launch the special inquiry. If Mr. Boyle felt the Govern­
ment was wrong (either about the failure o f the C.R.T.C. or about separatist 
infiltration of Radio-Canada), he had two alternatives. He could have 
rejected the Government's "request” for an inquiry; the C.R.T.C. has that 
power. Or he could have resigned. That he did neither is either an admis­
sion of C.R.T.C. failure or a collapse in the face o f political pressure.7
Yet. after listening to Mr. Boyle handle close questioning at a long press 
conference yesterday, one came away feeling a good deal better. The
5 Letter from T. Gregory Kane, General Counsel, September 29, 1976. The C.A.C. 
was only one among many concerned at the Minister’s proposal. “ Pay-T.V. 
dangerous says Faulkner,” Globe and Mail, August 11, 1976; Geoffrey Stevens, 
"Why? Why? Why?" ibid.. August 12, 1976; “Just hold on - we shouldn't be 
stampeded into pay-T.V.", Financial Post. August 21, 1976. “ Does anyone really 
like pay-T.V.” , ibid., September 25, 1976; “ Pay T.V. the ‘inevitable’ cultural dis­
aster” , Globe and Mail, October 4, 1976. The Commission, in a Notice o f Public 
Hearing dated February 3, 1977, rejected most submissions made to it as “ inade­
quate" which brought a sharp response from the Canadian Broadcasting 
League. “ Pay-T.V.: ‘briefs to heedless C.R.T.C. unwanted not inadequate’,” 
Globe and Mail, February 21, 1977.
6 "Trudeau calls on C.R.T.C. for a report by July 1 on separatists in C.B.C.” , Globe 
and Mail, March 5, 1977.
7 "Astounding". Globe and Mail, March 11, 1977. And see "Bias in Quebec: 
C.R.T.C. used as a political tool?” , ibid.. March 7, 1977.
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Government may have left the C.R.T.C. no practical alternative except to 
hold the inquiry, but the politicians are not going to be able to dictate the 
findings. . . .
Another reason for feeling better is the spirit in which the C.R.T.C. decided 
to conduct the inquiry. It could have rejected the Prime Minister’s ‘‘invita­
tion’’. but that as Mr. Boyle put it, would have been tantamount to hiding in 
the bushes. Besides, the Government would probably have turned to a par­
liamentary committee or some other potentially more divisive form of inves­
tigation. Asked whether it would be reasonable to assume the Commission 
had agreed to do the inquiry because it would be the least o f various evils,
Mr. Boyle replied: “ 1 think, yes . . . ”
Finally one feels better because the inquiry will be presided over by Harry 
Boyle himself. He’s his own man. “They (Government) named me Commis­
sioner,” he said yesterday. “They didn’t buy me, I remain who 1 am .” We 
are going to need h im .8
It remains to be seen what the long term effects of the inquiry 
will be on the Commission, and particularly its credibility as an 
independent body.
While most of the more prominent recent examples concerning 
the role of independent regulatory agencies are to be found at the 
federal level, reaction to the Ontario Highway Transport Board’s 
decision in December, 1976 to allow Greyhound to compete with 
Gray Coach is a classic example of the uncertainty as to how much 
policy making discretion should be delegated to regulatory 
boards.1*
Norman Webster, in a column on the appearance of Dr. Smith, 
Ontario’s Liberal Party Leader, before the Highway Traffic Board at 
the re-hearing of the Greyhound application, succinctly described 
the ramifications of the issue raised in the case.
The Liberal leader’s point is that the decision seems to reverse the previous 
policy of exclusive rights to major inter-urban routes. Such policy 
decisions, he contends, should be made by the elected representatives of  
the people, rather than by an appointed tribunal. Surely he is right.
This is not to say there is no place for regulatory agencies. The Highway 
Transport Board, for example, keeps the politicians’ hands out o f individu­
al licencing decisions, and that is just as it should be. But this should be 
done within a policy framework laid down by Government or Legislature.
The broad decisions affecting our society are much too important to leave 
to such agencies (which, in practice, can mean to the particular prejudices 
o f one strong member).
When the Ontario Municipal Board approved the Spadina Expressway, 
the ramifications went far beyond the construction of a road; William
8 "Reasons for feeling better” . Globe and Mail, March 15, 1977.
9 "Opposition parties to press for debate over Gray Coach” Globe and Mail, 
December 8, 1976; “Gray Coach to lose S756,000 in competition, hearing told”, 
ibid., January 25, 1977; "Smith says Gray Coach decision should have been left 
to the House", ibid., January 28, 1977; "Lewis wants special attention to Gray 
Coach as public firm” , ibid., February 12, 1977.
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Davis recognized this and reversed the decision. When the O.M .B. produced 
its offensive verdict on Toronto’s 45-foot by-law, the Davis Government 
again intervened.
Similarly, fundamental decisions affecting transportation in the province 
should not be made by a licencing agency. They should be made by people 
who are publicly accountable.
If the Government wants to change policy, it should do so. And then, if we 
wish, we can change the Government.
II. WHAT IS MEANT BY AN “INDEPENDENT” REGULA­
TORY AGENCY?
Canada never completely adopted the American model of an 
independent regulatory agency, although it has, on occasion, gone 
far in that direction. This hesitation is of central importance for an 
understanding of current regulatory issues in this country. Indeed, 
the history of regulation in Canada has been largely a constant 
process of working out the tensions inherent to our commitment to 
parliamentary responsibility and the need for regulatory tribunals 
which fall to some degree outside the sphere of immediate political 
control.
It would, as a result, be instructive to take a brief look at some 
representative topics in the history of regulation in Canada with an 
emphasis on the question of the relationship at any particular period 
of the regulatory tribunal to government and parliament. Before 
doing so, however, it would be well to establish at the outset just 
what is meant by the American model of an independent regulatory 
agency.
An independent regulatory agency is to be contrasted with a 
department. A department is an integral part of the executive 
hierarchy with the President at its head possessing complete powers 
of supervision and control. He has absolute removal powers over all 
departmental heads in order to ensure that the policies administered 
by them are not in conflict with his views. An independent regulatory 
agency is not part of the executive hierarchy and is not subject to 
Presidential direction. It is subject to Congressional “overview” , but 
Congress does not have the power to reverse its decisions except by 
legislation.
The key to independent status lies in the security of tenure for 
the commissioners who head the agencies. The classic affirmation of 
this security was provided in the well-known case of Humphrey's 
Executors v. United States." President Roosevelt discharged 
Humphrey as a Federal Trade Commissioner on the ground that “ I
10 Globe and Mail, January 31, 1977.
11 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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do not feel that your mind and my mind go along together on either 
the policies or the administering of the Federal Trade Commission.” 
The question was whether the statute limiting the President’s 
removal power to “ ineffeciency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in 
office” was constitutional. The Supreme Court held that it was.
The rationale for this independence has recently been re-stated 
by a Congressional committee in choosing to place the enforcement 
of the Consumer Protection Safety A ct in the hands of an agency 
rather than a department.
This decision reflects the committee’s belief that an independent agency 
can better carry out the legislative and judicial functions contained in this 
bill with the cold neutrality that the public has a right to expect o f regula­
tory agencies formed for its protection. Independent status, and bipartisan 
commissioners with staggered and fixed terms, will tend to provide greater 
insulation than is possible or likely in a cabinet-level department. The 
Commission’s decisions under this legislation will necessarily involve a 
careful meld of safety and economic considerations. This delicate balance, 
the committee believes, should be struck in a setting as far removed as 
possible from partisan influence.12
In reality, “ independence” must, of course, be relative. After 
all, agencies are created by Congress and may be abolished by it; 
they receive their legal mandate from Congress and the vigilance of 
the courts on judicial review will ensure that they do not overstep it; 
they are dependent on Congress for financial support, and the Presi­
dent in his appointments may well influence the direction of an 
agency. Indeed, as will be discussed later in this paper, there are 
currently in the United States strong moves to modify the independ­
ence of regulatory agencies. Be that as it may, in its classical form, 
an independent regulatory agency is to a very considerable extent 
free from direct intervention in the manner in which it carries out its 
mandate. This structural independence is further enhanced by the 
very broad terms of the mandates of most agencies. For instance, the 
Federal Communications Commission is simply instructed to regu­
late in the “ public interest” . As Davis notes, this is the practical 
equivalent of instructing the agency “ ‘Here is the problem. Deal 
with it’.” 13 This leaves a regulatory agency very wide scope for the 
formulation and implementation of policy independent of both Con­
gress and President. Hence fears of the “headless fourth branch of 
government” .
At its inception, regulation in Canada consciously rejected the 
American model. In 1886 a Royal Commission was appointed with
12 Quoted in K.C. Davis, Administrative Law o f the Seventies, Rochester, The 
Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co., 1976, p. 13.
13 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1958, Vol. 1, 
p. 82.
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instructions to examine the entire m atter of railway rate regulation 
and the proposals for an Interstate Commerce Commission which 
were at that time under study in the United States in order to deter­
mine whether a similar body was needed in Canada. After consider­
ation of the arguments for and against an independent regulatory 
body, the Royal Commission recommended that control of railway 
rates be assigned directly to the Railway Committee of the Privy 
Council, a sub-committee of the Cabinet.14 This was provided for in 
the Railway A ct of that year.15
It soon became apparent that this was not an ideal solution.
In the first place, the members o f the committee were not particularly 
familiar with railway problems and were politically vulnerable to outside 
influences. Secondly, the membership o f the committee changed constantly 
making it impossible to obtain continuity in the interests represented or the 
views presented. Finally, the Committee sat only in Ottawa and made no 
specific provisions to ensure that all parties with an interest in a particular 
question had an opportunity to present their v iew s.16
As a result the further comparative study of railway regulation 
in the United States and England, a new Railway Act was passed in 
1903 designed to set up a separate regulatory authority. It establish­
ed the Board of Railway Commissioners for Canada, consisting of 
three commissioners appointed by the Governor in Council. Each 
commissioner was to hold office during good behaviour for a period 
of ten years “ . . .  but may be removed at any time by the Governor in 
Council for cause.”
The Board was given broad regulatory authority over the rail­
ways both by way of specific orders as well as by more general regu­
lations. It was empowered to make its own rules of procedure. Find­
ings of fact made by the Board within its jurisdiction were declared 
to be conclusive. Provision was made for a stated case on a question 
of law to the Supreme Court of Canada. Appeal, by leave of a judge, 
lay on a question of jurisdiction to that Court and on a question of 
law by leave of the Board.
As may be seen from section 44 of the Act the break with the 
past was by no means complete.
Subject to the provisions o f this section, every decision or order o f the 
Board shall be final.
2. The Governor in Council may, at any time, in his discretion, either 
upon petition o f any party, person or company interested, or o f his own
14 Arthur R. Wright, “ An Examination of the Role o f the Board o f Transport 
Commissioners for Canada as a Regulatory Agency” , 1963 Can. Pub. Admn. 349 
at 350.
15 R.S.C. 1886, c.109.
16 Wright, supra, note 14, p. 351.
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motion and without any petition or application therefor, vary, change or 
rescind any order, decision, rule or regulation o f the Board, whether such 
order or decision be made inter partes or otherwise, and whether such reg­
ulation be general or limited in its scope and application; and any order 
which the Governor in Council may make with respect thereto shall be 
binding on the Board and all parties.
Despite this massive reserve clause which could ensure ultimate 
political accountability, it would appear that the 1903 Railway Act 
was designed to “judicialize” railway rate regulation. The Board was 
designated a "Court of Record” ; 17 was granted the “ powers, rights 
and privileges” of a Superior Court for “ . . .  all matters necessary 
and proper for the due exercise of its jurisdiction under this Act or 
otherwise for carrying this Act into effect” ; and, in a small but 
revealing section it was provided that the Board was not bound by 
the decisions of “ any other court” . 18 As the Minister of Railways 
and Canals in introducing the new act had bluntly put it “ . . .  all 
orders and regulations of the Board are judicial determinations” . 19
It is difficult, in principle, to reconcile the Minister’s character­
ization of the Board’s decisions with the open-ended provision for 
political intervention. It would appear that in a typically pragmatic 
Canadian way, it was hoped that we could have our cake and eat it 
too! Experience had shown that day-to-day regulation of the 
railways required full-time, detached professionalism which could 
most readily be attained through a separate body such as the Board 
of Railway Commissioners. At the same time, unlike the United 
States, the government was not prepared to surrender control entire­
ly. It may be further supposed that this compromise was possible 
because in a parliamentary system of government the legislature 
would be quite agreeable to seeing ultimate responsibility retained 
by the executive, because it would feel that it had some measure of 
direct control over the executive. In the United States, by contrast,
17 Over the years there has been considerable controversy as to the meaning to be 
given to the designation “Court o f Record” first mentioned in section 8 o f the 
1903 Act. Rod Kerr contended that the expression shielded the Board from 
criticism in Parliament and he cited rulings of the Speaker to the effect that it 
could not be attacked except by way o f impeachment. See his, “The Board of 
Transport Commissioners for Canada” , 1 Can. Bar Jour. (Feb. 1958) 46 at 48-9. 
J.W. Pickersgill greatly antagonized members o f the House o f Commons Stand­
ing Committee on Transportation when he refused to answer questions critical of 
the decisions o f the successor regulatory board, the C.T.C. See H.N. Janisch, The 
Regulatory Process o f  the Canadian Transport Commission, A n Agency Study for  
the Law Reform Commission o f  Canada pp. 105-106 (hereinafter “Agency 
Study” ). This report was submitted to the Law Reform Commission in August 
1975 and a final revised version was accepted by the Commission in December, 
1975.
18 Railway Act, S.C. 1903, c.58, ss.23(b), 42.
19 Wright, supra, note 14, p. 352.
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the President would be unwilling to see Congressional control and 
Congress would be equally averse to Presidential control. Thus 
political accommodation in the United States favoured independ­
ence, while in Canada it favoured a “best of both worlds” solution in 
which it was to be hoped that the benefits of ultimate political res­
ponsibility would not cancel out the benefits of at least some degree 
of independence.
To work, this compromise requires that careful limits be placed 
on the scope of the authority left to the regulatory body, and there 
must only a limited expectation of the regulatory process. As will be 
seen in the next section of this paper, where more recently too broad 
a policy role was assigned to the successor of the Board of Railway 
Transport Commissioners, the Canadian Transport Commission, 
and more ambitious, positive expectations were entertained of the 
regulatory process, great strains were placed on this compromise 
between independence and responsibility.
An appreciation of perceptions rather than realities is of the 
greatest importance to an understanding of the regulatory process, 
as of the judicial process. In much the same way as common law 
judges have for centuries denied that they “ made” new law but 
simply “discovered” existing law, so regulatory authorities and their 
creators always denied that they had anything to do with the making 
of policy. The policy to be applied was not that of the Board of Rail­
way Commissioners, but that contained in the Railway Act. 20
Yet a reading of the Railway Act of 1903 reveals broad grants of 
discretion which would allow ample scope for the development of 
policy. Yet the crucial factor is not the reality of hindsight, but con­
temporary perceptions. Thus as long as it was fe lt that the Board was 
not making policy decision, there would not be awkward questions 
about the legitimacy of a non-elected body’s making such decisions. 
Should the perception change and it be realized that regulatory 
agencies are not simply “judicial” bodies mechanically applying a 
clearcut policy mandate given them by parliament then the issue of 
political irresponsibility has to be confronted.
The broad, open-ended nature of section 44 of the Railway Act of 
1903, now carried over into section 64(1) of the National Trans­
portation Act, 21 has not, in practice, prevented the development of a
20 Almost fifty years later, the same perception prevailed. The Board o f Transport 
Commissioners was not a policy making body for " . . .  the function of laying 
down policy is that o f the government and parliament and not that o f the Board 
of Transport Commissioners” . ‘‘The Board . . .  is set up to administer govern­
ment policy not to make it.” Wright, supra, note 14 at pp. 362-3.
21 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-17.
92 U.N.B. LAW  JOURNAL
high degree of regulatory independence. This has been so because, if 
political considerations favoured the retention of ultimate control, 
those same considerations meant that it would be sparingly used. In 
many regulatory situations, especially those involving rates, it is 
politically advantageous to insist that a contentious matter was 
really a technical one best left to the specialist regulator. Indeed, 
over the years a series of “ precedents” were established which great­
ly restricted the circumstances in which a regulatory decision would 
be overturned.22
As may be seen from the figures, the success rate of appeals to 
the Governor in Council was hardly encouraging.
Appeals to Governor in Council21 
1904-1961
Dismissed ...................................................................................  39
A llow ed.......................................................................................  6
Referred back to B o a rd ............................................................ 15
Withdrawn, discontinued, etc........................................................12
Total ...................................................................................  72
Perhaps a brief recapitulation might be in order before moving 
on to a look at the history of broadcast regulation. It would appear 
that in federal transport regulation no clearcut choice was made to 
adopt the American independent regulatory agency model. At the 
same time, however, there was need felt for full-time professional 
regulators and this could be attained most easily by setting up a 
separate board. This type of arrangement could only work when 
relatively little was expected of the regulatory process and the role of 
the board was seen as essentially judicial and not policy oriented. 
Changed expectations and perceptions of the 1960’s and 70’s have 
substantially undermined this arrangement.
The regulation of broadcasting in Canada has almost run the 
entire spectrum from departmental control to independent regula­
tory agency. Events leading up to the overthrow of departmental 
regulation in the 1920’s were dramatic as well as instructive.
Originally many Canadian stations were owned by religious 
groups. One such station was controlled by a body known as the 
Universal Bible Students Association. The Minister of Marine and 
Fisheries, who was at the time responsible for broadcast licensing, 
received a number of complaints about attacks made by this station 
on other religious groups. The Minister decided to cancel the 
licences held by the Association.
22 Kerr, supra, note 17 at pp. 52-3.
23 Wright, supra, note 14, p. 385.
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This provoked a storm of protest and the government, following 
a deluge of 9,000 letters and a petition with over 450,000 names on 
it, announced its new policy in the following terms:
We have made up our minds that a change must be made in the broadcast­
ing situation in Canada. We have reached a point where it is impossible for 
a member o f the government or for the government itself to exercise the 
discretionary power which it is given by law . . .  for the very reason that the 
moment the Minister in charge exercises his discretion, the matter becomes 
a political football and a political issue all over C an ad a .. . .  We should 
change that situation and take broadcasting away from the influences o f all 
sorts which are brought to bear by all shades o f political parties.24
Some forty years later, in ushering in the Canadian Radio Tele­
vision Commission, the then Secretary of State, Judy LaMarsh, 
stated:
There is, I believe, generally widespread agreement that the regulation and 
supervision o f the broadcasting system should be delegated to an independ­
ent regulatory authority, and that this body and its decisions should be as 
free as possible from partisan political influence and the pressures o f 
vested interests. 25
Political realism and political idealism thus, conveniently, both 
favour an independent regulatory authority for broadcasting. From 
a realistic point of view broadcasting simply throws up too many hot 
potatoes for the politicians, while from an idealistic viewpoint it can 
be said that broadcasting is too sensitive an area for direct govern­
ment regulation. Yet it is important to note that even in this area, 
where strong arguments can be made for independence, the Ameri­
can model has not been fully adopted in Canada. This comes out 
clearly in an analysis of the Broadcasting Act. 26
Section 3, the “ Broadcasting Policy for Canada” concludes that 
“ . . .  the objectives of the broadcasting policy for Canada enunciated 
in this section can best be achieved by providing for the regulation 
and supervision of the Canadian broadcasting system by a single 
independent public authority” . The Act then proceeds to set up a 
regulatory system involving neither a “ single” nor an “ independent” 
public authority!
In the first place, no broadcasting licence can be issued unless 
the applicant has obtained a “ technical construction and operating 
certificate” under the Radio Act from the Department of Communi­
cations. 27 Should the Commission attach a condition to the licence 
of the C.B.C. . .the Corporation may refer the condition to the
24 Frank W. Peers, The Politics o f Canadian Broadcasting: 1920-1951, Toronto 
University o f Toronto Press, 1969, p. 33.
25 Commons Debates, November 1, 1967, p. 3747.
26 R.S.C. 1970, c.B-11.
27 Ibid., s.22(l)(b).
Minister for consideration and the Minister, after consultation with 
the Commission and the Corporation may give to the Executive 
Committee [of the Commission] a written directive with respect to 
the condition and the Executive Committee shall comply with that 
directive” . 28 If the Commission should conclude that the Corpora­
tion has failed to comply with any condition of its licence, it 
“ . .  .shall forward a report to the Minister . . .  and a copy of the
report shall be laid by the Minister before Parliam ent___ ” 29 Thus
regulation, far from being conducted by a single public authority, 
involves the Commission, the Minister of Communications, and even 
Parliament itself.
What then of “ independence” ? Under section 23 of the Act, the 
Governor in Council may set aside the issue, amendment or renewal 
of any broadcasting licence. Alternatively, it may refer the matter 
back to the Commission for re-consideration and if the Commission 
reaffirms its previous decision that too may be set aside. Broad as it 
is, it should be noted that it is not as open-ended as section 64 of the 
National Transportation Act in that it refers only to the issue, 
amendment or renewal of broadcasting licences and does not, for 
example, refer to the refusal or revocation of a licence. Moreover, it 
does not provide any means for the reversal of Commission policy 
even when formally cast in the form of regulations.
The Broadcasting Act does contain, for the first time, a positive 
means for government to control a regulatory agency. In section 22 
the Governor in Council is authorized to issue “directions” to the 
Commission with respect to certain specific matters. Most important 
of these topics is that which entitles the Governor in Council to 
designate the classes of applicants to whom broadcasting licences 
may not be issued. This power has been used to ensure Canadian 
ownership of broadcast undertakings.
Legal authority to give positive instructions to the regulatory 
authorities is a dominant characteristic of the 1977 proposals for the 
restructuring of the regulation of both transportation and telecom­
munications.
in .  BACKGROUND TO THE 1977 PROPOSALS
In the 1967 National Transportation A c t,M the newly created 
regulatory tribunal, the Canadian Transport Commission, was 
granted very extensive policy and advisory functions in addition to 
its strictly regulatory powers. Consider, for example, the breadth of 
the following sub-sections of section 22 of the Act.
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29 Ibid., s.24(3).
30 R.S.C. 1970, c.N-17.
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(a) inquire into and report to the Minister upon measures to assist in a 
sound economic development o f the various modes of transport over which 
Parliament has jurisdiction;
(b) undertake studies and research into the economic aspects o f all modes 
of transport within, into or from Canada;
(c) inquire into and report to the Minister on the relationship between 
the various modes o f transport within, into and from Canada and upon the 
measures that should be adopted in order to achieve coordination in devel­
opment, regulation and control o f the various modes o f transport;
(e) inquire into and report to the Minister upon possible financial 
measures required for direct assistance to any mode of transport and the 
method of administration of any measures that may be approved;
'%) establish general economic standards and criteria to be used in the 
determination of federal investment in equipment and facilities as between 
variou; modes o f transport and within individual modes o f transport and in 
the determination of desirable financial returns therefrom;
(h) inquire into and advise the government on the overall balance 
between expenditure programs of government departments or agencies for 
the provision o f transport facilities and equipment in various modes of 
transport, and on measures to develop revenue from the use o f transport 
facilities provided or operated by any government department or agency; 
and
(i) participate in the economic aspects o f the work of intergovernmental, 
national or international organizations dealing with any form of transport 
under the jurisdiction of Parliament, and investigate, examine and report 
on the economic effects and requirements resulting from participation in 
or ratification of international agreements.
The granting of power is one thing, its exercise another. In 
practice the Commission did not discharge its responsibility for 
policy formulation placed upon it by the National Transportation 
Act. I cited a number of illustrative examples of the reticence of Mr. 
Pickersgill to give advice on just the sort of matters falling within 
section 22 of the National Transportation Act in my study for the 
Law Reform Commission of Canada and concluded: “ In this matter 
Mr. Pickersgill was quite inconsistent. As Minister of Transport he 
had championed legislation designed to give wide policy initiatives to 
the regulatory commission while, subsequently, as head of that same 
regulatory commission he denied himself any major role in policy 
formulation” . 31
31 Agency Study, pp. 107-108. In a letter to the Globe and Mail, Mr. Pickersgill has 
recently asserted that policy making was never committed to the C.T.C. and that 
no power was taken away from the Minister o f Transport. “ Pickersgill Warns of 
Costly Bureaucracy” , Globe and Mail, March 10, 1977. It is submitted, with 
respect, that Mr. Pickersgill has missed the point. By specifically granting to the
C.T.C. broad powers o f inquiry, study, recommendation, report and advice as 
contained in section 22 of the National Transportation Act this placed the focal 
point o f policy formulation in the Commission. It is thus not so much that 
nothing was taken away from the Department - the important thing is what was 
given to the Commission and by implication denied to the Department.
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In a manner typical of many similar agencies, the Commission 
has tended to discharge its regulatory mandate almost exclusively on 
a case by case basis. As James Landis warned almost forty years ago: 
“The technical demands of administration are often so complex and 
absorbing that their solution tends to shorten vision. Administrative 
myopia that fails to see the woods because of the abundance of the 
trees, is not uncommon” . 32 As Gresham’s Law of Administration 
has it, “ Daily routine drives out planning” .
It is sometimes said that in its day-to-day work the Commission 
does not make policy. In fact the Commission does formulate 
secondary or regulatory policy as opposed to the primary policy 
determination which is contained in the statute itself. What it does 
not do is to articulate this policy openly. Even in those matters most 
conducive to case by case adjudication such as licensing, there exist, 
in practice, broad policies which govern the manner in which 
individual applications are dealt. For example, it is the policy of the 
Air Transport Committee of the Commission that in determining 
"public convenience and necessity” care will be taken to ensure that 
existing carriers are not adversely affected by a new licensee, full 
time operations are preferred over part time operations and inter­
veners must look after their own interests or risk the consequences. 
Moreover, there are minimum debt /equity requirements established 
by the Committee. Class III applications for non-competitive route 
extensions using existing aircraft are granted virtually automatically 
and initial helicopter licences are tied to bases and the showing of 
need in one particular locality despite the migratory habits of the 
industry as a whole.
Not only is the formulation of this type of policy inevitable but it 
is also desirable. It is inevitable because any decision maker, 
although rightly concerned to retain a reasonable degree of flexibil­
ity, does not wish to have to decide absolutely everything all over 
again with each application. It is desirable because this practice 
leads to some measure of consistency and predictability, particularly, 
of course, where the policy is made publically available.33
The Commission has not, by and large, made as much use as it 
might of policy statements. These can greatly improve the quality of 
submissions and hence the whole decision making process. By 
frankly and openly giving interested parties as much information as
32 James M. Landis, The Administrative Process, New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1938, p. 68.
33 The classic statement o f the need for administrative agencies themselves to 
clarify their mandates remains Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative 
Agencies, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1962.
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possible about the Commission’s thinking, no matter how tentative, 
the issues will be brought more sharply into focus and this will avoid 
confusion and arguments at cross purposes. This can be done very 
informally by way of information circulars, policy guidelines and the 
like. This information does not have to be clean cut and definitive to 
be of great assistance to both the Commission and interested parties.
What a policy statement calls for essentially is a willingness to 
venture out and deal with problems before they arrive as concrete 
cases demanding immediate solution. It requires foresight, an ability 
to generalize and the courage to be willing to risk being wrong. In 
return, policy statements and guidelines can lead to more effective 
and considerate regulation in that it gives the parties some advance 
indication of what they should do by way of preparation.34
The failure of the Commission either to respond in a positive 
manner to its responsibilities under section 22 of the National Trans­
portation A ct or to develop any consistent regulatory policy, has 
meant that it has lost, largely by default, the leadership role assigned 
to it.
However, it was by no means entirely by default, for in the early 
1970’s a major change was made in the relationship between the new 
Ministry of Transport (which superceded the Department of Trans­
port existing at the time of the enactment of the National Transport­
ation Act) and the Commission. As John Langford has noted, this 
involved a crucial shift in attitudes.
There was clearly little conviction on the part o f senior D.O.T. officials that 
the department should have a strong policy role. The department was seen to 
be primarily concerned with operations, and the C.T.C., through its regu­
latory and research roles, was viewed as the predominant policy maker 
within the national transportation framework.
This image of the department’s neutral policy role and limited obiectives 
was not shared by the new Deputy Minister who took over in 1 > o 9 .. .
According to this view, it was not possible to leave the policy-making role in 
the hands of the regulatory agency, the C.T.C. If the Minister o f Transport 
was to exercise proper policy-making powers, the D.O.T. would have to 
revise its objectives and the Minister’s portfolio would have to be strength­
ened organizationally to bring together, in a balanced manner, regulatory, 
developmental and operational considerations.35
As a result there was a major shift of policy and development- 
research roles from the Commission to the Policy, Planning and
34 Agency Stud, pp. 109-112.
35 John W. Langford, “The Making of Transport Policies • A Case Study: The 
Ministry o f Transport as a Policy Making Institution” , Studnicki-Gizbert, ed., 
Issues in Canadian Transport Policy, Toronto, MacMillan, 1974, p. 410. See also 
Langford’s Transport in Transition, The Reorganization o f the Federal Trans­
port Portfolio, Montreal, The Institute of Public Administration o f Canada,
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Major Projects Branch of the newly created Ministry of Transport. 
As well, the Transportation Development Agency was established 
and designed to become the new focal point of research and develop­
ment. Much more important than any structural alteration was the 
new conviction that the Ministry was to be responsible for the form­
ulation of primary or general policy. This shift in the locus of policy 
making was not, however, accompanied by any statutory reform and 
this has created serious difficulties.
One link, by way of appeal or review, was already in existence 
but it has proved to be an inherently unsatisfactory means of trans­
mitting policy. First, there can be no guarantee that the regulatory 
tribunal will treat appeal decisions as precedents and be guided by 
them. This certainly appears to have been a problem when the 
Minister of Transport sought to liberalize the Commission’s rulings 
on small charter operations and found it virtually impossible to do so 
by way of individual appeal decisions.36 Second, appeals all too 
often involve the changing of the rules after the game has been 
played. This has a seriously debilitating effect on conscientious regu­
lators, and if resorted to too often can undermine the whole rationale 
for regulatory tribunals.37
By way of contrast, in the regulation of broadcasting, differ­
ences between the Department of Communications and the 
Canadian Radio-Television Commission have centred on substantive 
disagreements with policies and decisions. This would appear largely 
to be because, unlike the C.T.C., the C.R.T.C. has been quite extro­
verted in its policy making and has, over the years, issued numerous
M cGill-Queen’s University Press, 1976, especially chapter 2, "The Department 
of Transport in 1968” .
The Deputy Minister to whom Langford refers was Gerald Stoner previously 
assistant secretary to the Cabinet in the Privy Council Office. "Stoner accepted 
the new position at Transport only after receiving a mandate from the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning to conduct a 
wide-ranging inquiry into D .O .T .’s priorities and role problems” . Langford, 
Transport in Transition, op. cit., p. 45.
In evidence before the Standing Committee, Stoner described the relationship he 
considered should exist between the Commission and Ministry to be as follows: 
"The government has issued, from time to time, statements o f policy . . .  It is 
within that policy framework, then, that the C.T.C. deals with individual applica­
tions” . House o f Commons, Standing Committee on Transportation and Com­
munications, 29th Pari., 2nd Sess., 1974, p. 4:38.
36 Agency Study, pp. 119-120.
37 Ibid.. pp. 120-121.
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policy statem ents38 and made more clearly discernible decisions on 
contentious matters such as the ownership of cable hardware, pay 
television, commercial deletion and the like.
Even more important than the evident structural tensions be­
tween departments and commissions was the increased expectation 
of regulation in the early 1970’s. This was to be particularly true of 
the transportation area where, notwithstanding some of the grand 
language of the National Transportation Act, the central thrust of 
reform had been in the direction of deregulation and in favour of 
com petition.19 J. W. Pickersgill, President of the Canadian Trans­
port Commission during its vital formative years, had grown less and 
less confident in the legitimacy and efficacy of regulation. As he was 
to confide to the Standing Committee on Transport and Communi­
cations in 1972:
I have been a regulator now for four and a half years and the longer I con­
tinue to be a regulator, the more I am in favour o f having as few regulations 
as possible because, it seems to me that having people second-guessing 
somebody else in the business makes for inefficiency all around. You need 
regulations for safety, you need regulations to deal with monopolies, but 
beyond that, I would rather not have a lot o f fellows who are not directly 
interested in the operation messing around with it .40
In government circles, in contrast, there was new enthusiasm 
for regulation — not traditional “economic” regulation but “ social” 
regulation designed to take into account newly identified concerns 
relevant to transport regulation. These included the rapid rise in 
the price of bulk commodities; northern development; a demande 
for more resource-efficient and cleaner transportation; an increased 
awareness of the disparity of opportunity within Canada, and the 
need for a fully integrated approach to transportation problem s.41 
As Transport Minister Marchand put it: “The present act sees 
transportation as primarily an economic service; I am proposing 
that it should be an instrument of public policy” . 42 If, in 
Clemenceau’s celebrated observation, “W ar is much too serious a 
matter to be entrusted to the military” , so, it may be argued, is regu­
lation likewise too important to be left to the regulatory agencies if it 
is to involve control of “ an instrument of public policy” .
38 For a comparison of the regulatory styles o f the C.T.C. and the C.R.T.C. see 
ibid., pp. 111-112.
39 Ibid.. pp. 5-17.
40 House of Commons Standing Committee on Transport and Communications, 
28th Pari., 4th Sess., 1972, p. 7:14.
41 Agency Study, pp. 17-19.
42 House o f Commons, Standing Committee on Transportation and Communica­
tions, 30th Pari., 1st Sess., 1974-5, p. 21:6.
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This change in the perception of regulation away from an 
essentially technical one is of vital importance to the participants in 
the regulatory process, particularly to the provinces which appear 
before federal regulatory tribunals. Their concern has always been 
that they should be able to participate effectively, and, as it has now 
been recognized that the process has a major policy component, 
their interest has shifted to some degree away from the formal hear­
ing procedures.43 The federal response has been to offer the 
provinces a political forum outside of the public regulatory arena. 
This new understanding was well summed up in Ontario’s brief to 
the C.R.T.C. Telecommunications Regulation Procedures and 
Practices hearing in October, 1976.
In this context, however, one longstanding and basic feature o f the Govern­
ment o f Ontario’s position on communications policy should be reiterated. 
W hile the Commission must inevitably be involved with matters o f policy 
and make decisions o f a policy nature, it is Ontario’s firm belief that policy 
decisions on major communications issues should be made by elected rep­
resentatives and reflect government-to-government discussions. To this 
end, Ontario has already indicated to the Federal Minister o f Communica­
tions, its agreement with the Grey Paper proposal, " . . .  that the Governor 
in Council should be authorized to give formal directions to the Commis­
sion on the interpretation o f statutory objectives and the means for their 
implementation.” 44
IV. THE 1977 PROPOSALS
The immediate goal of the amendments to the National Trans­
portation Act and related legislation contained in Bill C-33 45 intro­
duced in January, 1977, is to consolidate, in statutory form, the shift 
to the Ministry of Transport of the research and policy-making 
responsibilities assigned to the Canadian Transport Commission by 
section 22 of the Act. Important as this might be, the real signifi­
cance of the Bill is that it is not confined to this task alone, but seeks 
to establish an entirely new relationship between Ministry and Com­
mission. Simply put, our concern should be to assess whether the 
pendulum has again swung too far.
After setting out the new objective of the transportation policy 
in section 3(1) and the principles applicable to implementation of the 
policy in section 3(2), the Bill categorically asserts the preeminence 
of the Ministry in section 3(3) which provides: “ It is the responsibility
43 For a valuable analysis, see Richard Schultz, “ Intergovernmental Cooperation, 
regulatory agencies and transportation regulation in Canada: the case o f Part III 
of the National Transportation Act” , 19 Can. Pub. Adm. 184, especially 200-205 
(1976).
44 Submission o f the Minister o f Transport and Communications for the Province 
of Ontario, p. 4.
45 An A ct to Amend the National Transportation A c t . . Bill C-33, 30th Pari., 2nd 
Sess., 1976-77, 1st Reading, January 27, 1977.
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of the Minister to undertake the necessary measures to achieve the 
objective of the transportation policy . . . ” By contrast, section 22(1) 
is much less expansive:
The Commission shall exercise such powers and perform such duties and 
functions as are conferred or imposed on it by law with respect to licensing, 
authorizing or requiring the operation of, and controlling the rates and 
, tariffs for, any mode of transport.
In case there was any doubt left as to the completeness of the 
shift of all responsibility, aside from licensing and rate regulation, to 
the Ministry, an extraordinarily broad “ afterthought” power is 
reserved to the Governor-in-Council in section 3.1.^
For the purpose o f achieving the objective o f the transportation policy 
referred to in subsection 3(1), the Governor in Council may, by order, 
transfer to the Minister any powers, duties or functions conferred or im ­
posed on the Commission by this Act or any other Act, but this section does 
not authorize the transfer o f any power, duty or function mentioned in sub­
section 22(1).
Finally, and most significantly, is the provision, in section 5.1 
for “directions” to the Commission.
The Governor in Council may, by order, on the recommendation of the 
Minister, issue such directions to the Commission as he considers necessary 
to achieve the objective o f the transportation policy referred to in subsec­
tion 3(1) having due regard to the principles described in subsection 3(2), 
but each such direction shall be without specific reference to any particular 
matter before the Commission.
It is then provided in section 21(1) (b) that it shall be the duty of 
the Commission to comply with all directions issued by the Governor 
in Council pursuant to section 3.2” .
The proposed Telecommunications Act, Bill C-43,4 introduced 
in March, 1977, is a much more comprehensive piece of legislation 
than Bill C-33. The transportation amendments, aside from re-cast- 
ing the transportation policy and the structural arrangements for 
regulation, leave all the existing legislation such as the Aeronautics
46 This will entitle the Governor in Council to amend the principal act and other 
legislation by regulation. H.W.R. Wade has concluded that “ . . .  as the intricacy 
o f legislation grows steadily more formidable, some power to adjust or reconcile 
statutory provisions has to be tolerated.” Administrative Law, Oxford. Claren­
don Press, 1971, p. 319. McRuer was o f the opinion that this practice “ . . .  should 
not be adopted in Ontario where statutes are not as complicated and do not go so 
far back in time as they do in the United Kingdom.” Royal Commission Inquiry 
into Civil Rights, Ontario, 1968, p. 345. The best stance would appear to be that 
of the Donoughmore Committee which recommended that this power should 
only be used when justified before Parliament on compelling grounds. Cmd. 4060 
(1932), p. 61.
47 An Act Respecting Telecommunications in Canada, Bill C-43, 30th Pari., 2nd 
Sess., 1976-77, 1st Reading, March 22, 1977.
I
A ct,4* Railway A c t /9 and most of the National Transportation 
A c t50 in place. By contrast, Bill C-43, proposes new legislation deal­
ing for the first time with the whole of the field of telecommunica­
tions and makes special provision for participation by the provinces. 
In so doing, however, it also proposes significant changes in the 
relationship between the Department of Communications and the 
regulatory agency, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecom­
munications Commission.
At the outset it should be noted that Bill C-43 does not employ 
quite the same strident tone as Bill C-33. Rather than provide that 
the Minister is responsible for achieving the objectives of the tele­
communications policy, section 6 is much more modest and merely 
lists the relatively limited specific powers granted to the Minister. 
Interestingly, it is not provided in section 9, the direction power, that 
the Governor in Council act only on the recommendation of the 
Minister as in section 3.2 of Bill C-33. As well, the evocative refer­
ence to independence, which originally appeared in the Broadcast­
ing Act, is carried over into section 3 of the telecommunications bill 
in the exhortationary provision that “ . . .  the telecommunications 
policy for Canada . . can best be achieved by providing for the 
regulation and supervision of the Canadian broadcasting system and 
of telecommunications . . .  by a single independent public body.”
Notwithstanding its quieter tone, Bill C-43 does propose two 
important changes in the relationship between the Department of 
Communications and the Commission. Both are designed to shift 
power away from the Commission. First, is the broadened provision 
for the Governor-in-Council to set aside or refer back.
11. (1) The Governor in Council may, notwithstanding anything in this 
Act. either on his own motion or on a request made in writing within 
thirty days after the publication of any decision of the Commission, by 
order made within sixty days after such publication or within such 
further period as is determined by order o f the Governor in Council 
made within sixty days after such publication, set aside the decision or 
any portion of the decision or refer the decision back to the Commis­
sion for reconsideration.
(2) An order o f the Governor in Council made under subsection (1) 
shall set forth the details o f any matter that, in his opinion, the Com­
mission failed to consider adequately.
12. (1) Where a decision or any portion thereof is referred back to the 
Commission under subsection 11(1), the Commission shall reconsider 
the matter and may, with or without a public hearing under Part II,
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49 R.S.C., 1970, c.R-2.
50 R.S.C., 1970, c.N-17.
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rescind the decision or that portion thereof or confirm it, either with or 
without change.
(2) A decision or any portion thereof confirmed pursuant to subsec 
tion (1) may be set aside by order o f the Governor in Council made 
witnin sixty days after such confirmation.
When compared with section 23 of the Broadcasting Act, these 
sections: (i) provide for the setting aside or reference back of “ any 
decision” which, in broadcasting, will include the revocation or 
refusal to issue and not, as at present, merely the issue, amendment 
or renewal of a licence; (ii) make it clear that the setting aside or 
reference back may be on the Governor in Council’s own motion or 
in response to a request in writing (apparently from anyone); 
(iii) provide that a portion only of a decision may be set aside or 
referred back, (iv) allow for the setting aside or reference back to be 
extended indefinitely beyond the sixty day period; (v) indicate that in 
a reference back a public hearing is discretionary, unlike under the 
present Broadcasting Act.
Second, Bill C-43 gives a power of direction to the Governor-in- 
Council, although, because of the sensitivities involved in broadcast­
ing, it is somewhat more circumspect than the equivalent provision 
in Bill C-33.
9. (1) Subject to subsection (2). the Governor in Council may, by order, 
issue directions to the Commission from time to time respecting the 
implementation of the telecommunication policy for Canada enun­
ciated in Section 3.
(2) Nothing in this Act authorizes the Governor in Council to issue 
directions to the Commission with respect to
(a) the issue of a broadcasting licence to a particular applicant or the 
amendment or renewal thereof,
(b) the content o f broadcasting programming;
(c) the application of qualitative standards to broadcasting program­
ming,
(d) the restriction of freedom o f expression, or
(e) the charges to be levied for particular telecommunication services 
or facilities,
but nothing in paragraphs (a) to (e) prevents the Governor in Council 
from issuing directions to the Commission respecting
(0  the maximum number of channels or frequencies for the use of  
which broadcasting licences may be issued within a geographical 
area designated in the directions,
(g) the reservation o f channels or frequencies for the use o f the 
Corporation or for any special purpose designated in the directions, 
or
(h) the classes o f applicants to whom broadcasting licences may not be 
issued or to whom amendments or renewals thereof may not be 
granted.
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V. INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Before dealing specifically with the implications of Bills C-33 
and C-43 and their impact on the role of the independent regulatory 
agency in Canada, it would be well to take into account some of the 
criticism which has been levelled against the American independent 
regulatory agency model. The main thrust of this criticism, in its 
concern for greater political accountability, is similar to that now 
current in Canada, although it dates back to the mid-1950’s and is 
the product of much more sophisticated reflection than has yet 
emerged in this country.
More than twenty years ago, a leading critic of the regulatory 
process, Marver Bernstein, highlighted the role of the Progressive 
Reform Movement in consolidating and expanding the role of 
independent regulatory agencies at the start of this century. Their 
prime concern, to put it in the vernacular, had always been to “get 
regulation out of politics” ! “The Progressives had an abiding faith in 
regulation, expertness and the capacity of American government to 
make rational decisions provided experts in the administrative 
agencies could remain free from partisan political considera­
tions. . . ” 51
Good intentions notwithstanding, regulation remained, as 
Bernstein emphasized, an intensely political process. As the popular 
jingle would have it, “ You can get the regulation out of politics, but 
you cannot get the politics out of regulation” . To hand major policy­
making over to politically irresponsible bodies was to subscribe to a 
dangerously naive concept of democracy as a scheme of government 
to which political responsibility has no necessary relevance.52
Without direct political support and involvement, Bernstein 
argued, the regulatory process will never be effective. In practice 
agencies have not found strength through independence, but merely 
weakness in isolation.
Strong political leadership is basic to regulatory success. Without the 
backing of political leaders in the legislative and executive branches of 
government, a regulatory agency will be unable to make significant head­
way against the opposition of the regulated interests. The failure of 
political leaders to formulate regulatory goals and give support to regula­
tory policies paves the way for acceptance by the agency of the philosophy 
and values as well as specific regulatory proposals o f affected groups. S3
While Bernstein’s analysis successfully challenged much of the 
mythology which has grown up around independent regulatory
51 Marver Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1955, p. 36.
52 Ibid., p. 146.
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agencies, he stopped short of advocating specific reforms. In a few 
years this omission was to be supplied, in dramatic fashion, by Louis 
J. Hector in his memorandum to President Eisenhower on his resig­
nation from the Civil Aeronautics Board. He concluded that inde­
pendent regulatory commissions were inherently flawed and that it 
was impossible to expect the development of coherent policy, or the 
necessary coordination with other government agencies, from such 
bodies. He proposed radical surgery as the only solution.
The problems of the C. A.B. are not transitory or superficial. They are basic.
In my opinion they are born of the very concept o f an independent admin­
istrative commission. In view of what seems to be these organic faults, I 
would recommend the following:
1. Transfer policy-making, planning and administration from the C.A.B. to 
an executive agency, such as the Department o f Commerce, the Federal 
Aviation Agency, or a new Department o f Transportation.
2. Transfer the judicial and appellate duties of the C.A.B. to a true adminis­
trative court.
3. Transfer the duties o f investigation and prosecution to an executive 
agency such as the Department o f Justice.54
More recently, the Ash Council proposed that independent reg­
ulatory agencies be abolished in favour of commissions headed by 
single administrators who would be members of the President’s 
administration. “ Accountability is an essential element of demo­
cratic government. Congress and the President are accountable to 
the people for the performance of government. In turn, agencies of 
government headed by appointed officials should be responsive and 
responsible to Congress, to the Executive, and through them, 
ultimately to the people.” 55
Along with the realization that regulatory policy decisions are 
essentially political, has been a growing awareness that the “ com­
mission movement” involved a naive faith in experts and expertness. 
As James Landis, a great proponent of regulation by independent 
agencies, facilely put it in 1938, “With the rise of regulation, the 
need for expertness became dominant, for the art of regulating an
54 Louis J. Hector, “ Problems of the C.A.B. and the Independent Regulatory Com­
missions” , 69 Yale L.J. 931 at 932 (1960). Immediately following the "Hector 
M emorandum” is a reply from Earl W. Kintner, Chairman, Federal Trade Com­
mission, “The Current Ordeal of the Administrative Process: In Reply to Mr. 
Hector” , ibid., 965.
55 The President’s Advisory Council on Executive Organization, A New Regulatory 
Framework, Report on Selected Independent Regulatory Agencies. Washington, 
Government Printing Officer, 1971. The report is popularly known after its 
chairman, Roy L. Ash. For an excellent critique, see Roger G. Noll, Reforming 
Regulation, An Evaluation o f the Ash Council Proposals, W ashington, The 
Brookings Institute, 1971.
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industry requires knowledge of the details of its operation . . . ” 56 
Yet as Louis Jaffe was to admit thirty years later, “The notion so 
sedulously cultivated by many of us during the New Deal days that 
agencies, because they were expert, could go on spinning out of their 
own guts a continuing series of miraculous solutions was an absurd 
and a-historical illusion. The stuff of great public policy controver­
sies is basically political and can only be solved in the political 
arena” . 57
In recent years radical proposals of the Hector-Ash variety have 
given way to more moderate suggestions. The independent regula­
tory agency has been able to survive its critics in large measure be­
cause the case against them has been overstated and little thought 
was given to concrete proposals for alternate decision-making 
processes.58 Yet thinking about the agencies will never be quite the 
same after Bernstein and the persistence of concern to establish 
some degree of accountability makes the independent model postu­
lated at the outset of this paper somewhat dated. Debate has shifted 
from whether to how political accountability is to be attained. While 
no specific plan has yet been adopted, there would appear to have 
been an irreversible change in the nature of the relationship between 
independent regulatory agencies and the rest of government.
The leading proponents of the movement towards greater 
accountability are Lloyd N. Cutler and David R. Johnson whose 1975 
article “ Regulation and the Political Process” has been frequently 
cited in the present plethora of Congressional committee reports on 
regulatory reform. Their approach is essentially neo-Bersteinian in 
their insistence that regulation be recognized as part of the main­
stream of politics.
Regulatory agencies are deeply involved in the making of “ political” 
decisions in the highest sense o f that term - choices between competing 
social and economic values and competing alternatives for government 
action - decisions delegated to them by politically accountable officials.
56 James M. Landis, The Administrative Process, supra, note 32, p. 23.
57 Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Study on Federal 
Regulation, Volume 2, “Congressional Oversight o f Regulatory Agencies” , 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess., February, 1977, p. 6, note 13.
A broader approach to regulation which seeks to take into account the poly- 
centric nature o f regulatory decisions and the growing need for cooperation 
between specialized agencies, tends to favour “generalists” rather than “experts” 
as regulators and to downplay dedicated professionalism in pursuit o f a single 
objective. See Cutler & Johnson, "Regulation and the Political Process” , 84 Yale 
L.J. 1395 at 1405-6 (1975).
58 See K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 1970 Supplement, St. Paul, West 
Publishing Co., 1971, pp. 11 -15; Administrative Law o f  the Seventies, Rochester, 
The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co., 1976, pp. 11-19.
59 Cutler & Johnson, “ Regulation and the Political Process” , 84 Yale L.J. 1395 at 
1399(1975).
U.N.B. LAW  JOURNAL 107
It is a basic paradox of the American regulatory philosophy 
(and of the Canadian, as well) that respect is expressed for the non­
political independence of the regulatory process until such time as 
an unpopular decision is made, and then the political process is 
invoked to change it. Rather than rely on one shot statutory inter­
vention, “ We need also to consider whether and how to create a sys­
tem for continuous political monitoring of all government regula­
tion, to ensure its responsiveness to the changing economic and 
social needs that the political process reflects.” “
Cutler and Johnson readily concede that it is unrealistic to 
expect that regulation will not involve a high degree of delegation, 
but they insist that a distinction has to be maintained between dele­
gation and abdication.
We cannot fault our elected leaders for delegating responsibility when that 
is the only way to do the job. But perhaps we should fault them - rather 
than praise their commitment to agency "independence” and "expertise”
- when they delegate authority and refrain from reviewing and correcting 
the acts o f their delegates in order to avoid responsibility for how the job is 
don e.61
They propose that the President be given a power somewhat 
similar to the “direction” power contained in Bill C-33 and C-43 
although he would be required to make a full statement of his feel­
ings and reasons for intervention as well as to allow for public partic­
ipation. A Presidential Order to a regulatory agency would be 
subject to veto by either House of Congress.62
It is very important to notice that the purpose of these proposals 
is to ensure accountability in two complementary senses. First, it 
gives the President and Congress a say in the determination of major 
regulatory policy. Second, it ensures that everything is done openly 
and in such manner as to maximize political accountability.
Many voters will oppose any further concentration of governmental 
decision making power, especially in “ political" hands. For their part, 
many elected politicians would prefer not to be held so clearly responsible 
for regulatory actions. Moreover, there is always a danger that the power to 
intervene could be abused.
Nevertheless, since presidential intervention to favor special friends or 
interests would be highly visible and therefore involve high political risks, 
the dangers o f abuse in our proposal do not appear overwhelming. More­
over, the President’s actions will rarely if ever be directed at a particular 
agency proceeding. Most instances o f regulatory failure stem from the 
inability o f independent and expert bodies with separate missions to set 
national policy priorities and execute them in a balanced and politically
60 Ibid., 1397. Emphasis in original.
61 Ibid., pp. 1401-2.
62 Ibid.. pp. 1414-17.
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acceptable fashion. Under our proposal the President, if he persuades 
Congress not to block his action, would have the power to set and execute 
such priorities when he believes that an agency has failed to do so or that 
the policies set by two or more agencies are in conflict. That is precisely the 
power that no one possesses under the existing regulatory structure. It is 
nothing more nor less than the power to govern effectively and accountably 
in the present age .63
VI. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE 1977 PROPOSALS
The central issue in this section of the paper must be the new 
power of positive intervention in the regulatory process by way of 
directions from the Governor in Council. By way of introductory 
background, two broad concerns should first be discussed - the fear 
that the proposals will “ emasculate” the regulatory agencies,M and 
that they will lead to an undesirable “politicization” of regulation.hS 
Both coalesce in the further concern for continuity and stability in 
policy making.
Fear of emasculation is expressed particularly in regard to the 
C.T.C. where, as pointed out above, only its “judicial” powers with 
respect to licensing and rate making are to be guaranteed to it. 
While the Minister is authorized to delegate his powers to the Com­
63 Ibid., pp. 1417-8. In the post-Watergate period most o f the initiative to estab­
lish greater accountability over the regulatory agencies has come from Congress. 
See, for example. Congressional Review ofAdministrative Rulemaking, Hearings 
before Subcommittee on Administrative Law of the Judiciary Committee of the 
House o f Reps., October-November, 1975, S.N. 30; Federal Communications 
Commission Oversight, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Communications 
of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce o f the House of Reps., 
March 2, 3, 1976, S.N. 94-89; Improving Congressional Oversight o f Federal 
Regulatory Agencies, Hearings before the Committee on Government Opera­
tions. United States Senate, May, 1976; Study on Federal Regulation, Volume 2, 
"Congressional Oversight o f Regulatory Agencies” , Committee on Government 
Operations, United States Senate, February, 1977. For a useful overview which 
expresses concern that many of these proposals go too far, see John R. Bolton, 
The Legislative Veto, Unseparating the Powers, W ashington, American Enter­
prise Institute, 1977.
64 "Rules for the rule-makers” , Financial Times o f Canada, February 14, 1977; Mr. 
Nowland, Commons Debates, March 7, 1977, p. 3712, “C.T.C. role ‘castrated’ 
Nowlan says". Globe and Mail, March 8, 1977.
The initial discussion in the newspapers has been of an encouragingly high cali­
bre and has included the critical view of Chairman Boyle o f the C.R.T.C. and, 
more recently, those o f Marshall Crowe, chairman of the N.E.B. See, particular­
ly, Gordon D. Hutchison, “Ottawa dials for power” , Financial Post, April 2, 
1977; Barabra Keddy, “ Boyle, Government bristling on telecommunications 
issues” . Globe and Mail, April 6, 1977; Stephen Duncan, “ ‘Neutral’ rule o f  
agencies seems doom ed” , Financial Post, April 2, 1977, “ Boards growl at Cabi­
net’s political plan", ibid., April 23, 1977.
65 Ken Romain, “ Radical bill on transport shifts power” , Globe and Mail, Febru­
ary 10, 1977, “ Political overtones of transportation bill disturbing to members of 
traffic league”. Globe and Mail, March 12, 1977.
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mission, there is at the moment little indication that the Ministry is 
in any mood to do so. The Commission may participate in the work 
of intergovernmental, national or international organizations in 
relation to the regulation of transportation but only with the 
approval and in consultation with the Minister.** It is also 
authorized to sponsor research considered necessary “ . . .  for the 
purpose of exercising any of its powers or performing any of its 
duties or functions.” 67 This would seem to limit it to research 
touching immediately on its licensing or rate making powers, 
although this might include its rulemaking responsibilities under 
other statutes, such as the Aeronautics Act.
While there is much need for this type of detailed analysis, the 
overriding issue concerns the cumulative impact on the Commission 
of open-ended appeals to, and general directions from, the Governor 
in Council. If these powers were to be broadly exercised, there is 
reason to believe that they would have a demoralizing effect on the 
Commission and would go far to undermine the integrity and 
credibility of the regulatory process.
Much can be learned from an American example. One major 
exception to the finality, aside from judicial review, accorded the 
decisions of the independent regulatory agencies in the United 
States, is that awards to U.S. air carriers of overseas or foreign air 
routes under section 801 of the Federal Aviation Act take the form of 
recommendations to the President. The rationale for this departure 
from normal administrative process was, apparently, concern that, 
as foreign relations and security considerations are involved in these 
route awards, the final say should be with the President. In practice, 
particularly in recent years, immediate party political considerations 




68 In Canada, international routes are similarly decided by the executive with the 
International Transport Policy Committee o f the C.T.C. playing a somewhat 
similar advisory role to that o f the C.A.B. The 1974 renegotiation o f the Canada- 
U.S. bilateral air agreement brought out some of the tensions involved in this 
procedure. ‘‘As an international route matter it was solely a Cabinet decision that 
awarded twelve trans-border routes to Air Canada, one to C.P. Air and two to the 
regionals. There was a bitter reaction to this decision from C.P. Air and the 
regionals implying that their intra-Canada development, as guided by the Com­
mission, had been proceeding in a different direction and away from the restric­
tions on competition with Air Canada which were imposed by this Cabinet 
decision. Indeed, Quebecair’s purchase o f a Boeing 727 had been in anticipation 
of receiving the Quebec City-New York route. After coming up empty-handed, 
Quebecair president Lionel Chevrier stated that “ . . .  the current favouritism of  
Air Canada at the expense o f the regional airlines is a calamity.” Agency Study, 
pp. 39.
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In a carefully documented submission to the Subcommittee on 
Aviation of the Senate Commerce Committee on June 15, 1976, the 
Subcommittee on Aviation of the Administrative Law Section of the 
American Bar Association pointed out four major adverse effects of 
an attempt to blend together a rational administrative process and 
crass party politics.69
1. Staff people within the Executive Branch freely super­
impose their views o f  the facts and policy issues for the findings and 
conclusions o f the Board.
Staff people within the Executive Branch have been encouraged to second 
guess the Board and render the very time-consuming process a nullity. The 
801 process, which was intended only to allow the President and his key 
advisers to bring to bear significant foreign policy and national defence 
considerations, has in fact become a de novo review. Individuals . . .  
perceive the review process as an opportunity to express their individual 
judgments on all aspects o f the decision - need for competition, the route to 
be created and the carrier to be selected. Nothing that the Board has done 
by way of findings is given any particular w e ig h t.. . .  The staff people 
reviewing the decision are imbued with a sense o f considerable personal 
power which transcends what should flow from the proper exercise o f their 
responsibility. . . .  To them it is a grand gam e.70
2. A ir Carriers spend time and money on political activity, 
consultants, and involvement o f their own officials in an effort to 
manipulate or protect themselves during the Presidential review 
process.
It seems to us that in a public service business the regulatory process 
should be carefully molded to encourage the regulated to do a better job.
They should be rewarded for performance which serves the public interest.
For the airlines that means achieving the highest level o f efficiency and 
providing the best service at the lowest fares. Instead the system . . .  
appears to reward those who are best able to manipulate the government 
process.71
3. The present process is destructive to the morale o f the 
Board.
Route cases, and particularly those involving major international routes 
require a substantial undertaking at all levels within the C.A.B. The individ­
ual effort by those engaged in this process is bound to be affected by the 
degree o f integrity in the decisional process, and by the degree o f respect 
accorded to its results. If the staff people . . .  and the Board members 
recognize that the end product will be a fair reflection of the results o f their 
individual efforts, they will be encouraged to perform well. If, on the other 
hand, the decision is unlikely to be related to those efforts, the level of 
performance is bound to deteriorate.72
69 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Commerce 
of the United States Senate, 94th Cong. 2nd Sess., 1976, S.N. 94-104.
70 Ibid., p. 814.
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4. Public respect fo r this process, and governmental processes 
in general, is diminished.
Major 801 cases have been well covered by the press. The results on many 
occasions are depicted as politically motivated. There has been good cause 
for suspicion as to the efforts by carriers to manipulate the process and 
often as to their success. This has become another area in which the way in 
which governmental functions are performed leads to public suspicion of 
the lack o f integrity in the governmental process. It is one more element 
contributing to the deterioration o f the public’s image of government.!73
There is little reason to believe that things would be very differ­
ent in Canada (at best they might be a little more discreet) if the 
power it is proposed to grant the Govemor-in-Council were to be 
more broadly exercised. However, as discussed above, we do have a 
history of considerable executive restraint in any involvement in the 
regulatory process, and it may be that fears of emasculation and 
politicization are based on a reading of the wording of the grants of 
power and not on a realistic assessment of the manner in which the 
power will be exercised in practice. Presumably the same inhibitions 
will continue to apply to any action, whether by way of a reversal of a 
decision of the Commission or by way of a policy direction to it. 
Action brings with it political responsibility and the danger of shift­
ing criticism from commission to government.
Nevertheless, three new factors may upset the longstanding 
inhibitions on political intervention.
First, the changing perceptions as to the nature of regulation 
will make it much more difficult than in the past to pass it off as a 
highly technical business best left to experts. The more the govern­
ment emphasizes the social side of regulation and its role in combat­
ting regional disparities, and plays down its traditional economic 
focus, the more difficult it will be to keep from involvement and the 
more there is involvement the more political it is likely to be.
Second, the very grant of the powers encourages their use. For 
instance, the government will no doubt deny any ability to reverse 
individual decisions by directions, but then it still has broad appeal 
powers. Even if the particular decision is not reversed, a power of 
direction may be seen as a responsibility for future correction.
Third, and possibly most important, an impressive parallel 
regulatory bureaucracy has been built up in the Department of 
Communications and the Ministry of Transport with considerable 
second guess capability. No doubt, to some extent in the past, the 
plea of technicality was used to avoid involvement for political 
reasons. But, it appears equally true that, at least to a considerable
73 Ibid.. p. 816.
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extent, this plea was true on its face and that the government outside 
of the regulatory agencies simply lacked the resources to take a 
second look at a complex railway or telephone rate case or to develop 
regulatory policy. Moreover, it is not very likely that departmental 
employees are ever going to find much right about commission 
decisions, as to a considerable extent their jobs rest on the premise 
that the right policies and decisions will not be forthcoming from the 
regulatory agency. There also should be concern as to the dog and 
his tail. As has been discussed, the initiative for the shift of power 
from the C.T.C. to the Ministry seemed to come to a considerable 
extent from a determined reform minded Deputy Minister. It is thus 
possible that political sensitivities may be overshadowed by technical 
chauvinism and ministerial political caution overriden by the 
expertise of the ambitious Monday morning quarterback.
It would be well at this point to identify the central thesis of this 
paper, for without further explanation, it would seem to be headed 
into a basic internal contradiction. On the one hand the insistence of 
Bernstein and Cutler and Johnson that regulation be recognized as 
part of the political process has been adopted, while on the other 
misgivings have been expressed at this very process of politicization. 
Doesn’t the political process have to be accepted warts and all? 
Wasn’t an effete concern for “ rationality” exactly the mistake of the 
Progressives when they sought to take regulation out of politics? Yet, 
surely, one is entitled to be optimistic about politics! As Cutler and 
Johnson put it, regulation is concerned with “ . . .  ‘political’ 
decisions in the highest sense of that term -----” Therefore, in deter­
mining the role of the independent regulatory agency, every effort 
should be made to ensure that structural reform brings out the best 
in the political system, and that openness and accountability are 
employed in such manner as to ensure the highest quality of political 
involvement. This is particularly significant in relation to the direc­
tion power to be duscussed shortly.
Along with the fears of the politicizing of regulation there is a 
very real concern as to continuity and stability in policy-making. It is 
ironic to note that a forceful plea for stability in the regulatory 
process was one of the main points of the leading Conservative trans­
portation critic in his comments on Bill C-33. Mr. Horner warned 
that billions of dollars will have to be spent on the transportation 
system. This requires long range planning “ . . .  but how can we have 
that and spend the money necessary without any certainty that the 
policy which exists today will exist tomorrow? That is how quickly 
changes could be implemented through this legislation. The 
Governor in Council can change that policy with a flick of the finger, 
and that is of concern to the industry.” 74
74 Commons Debates, March 1, 1977, p. 3533.
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•
This was, indeed, the concern of the president of the Canadian 
Trucking Association in his assessment of the Bill.
Whether there will be instability and uncertainty in transport policy in 
future will depend on how ‘‘political” transportation policy is in future and 
also on the stability and continuity in the Transport Canada bureaucracy.
In this regard, there is not much reason to be optimistic based on recent 
performance. Not only do we now have ministers playing musical chairs 
with portfolios every couple o f years, but it would seem that senior officials 
and particularly those involved in policy planning, have taken up the same 
sport. This means that every two or three years there is likely to be a whole 
new wave of personalities involved in transportation planning, who for the 
most part, have little direct background in transportation. It will be these 
officials who are called on to respond to the political pressures that are 
exerted. Instead of cranking-up a royal commission or task force every ten 
years or so to review transportation policy, followed by an exhaustive legis­
lative overhaul where all interested parties can be heard to the point of 
exhaustion, we will in future have an ultra-streamlined approach to trans­
portation policy evolution so that whatever views on transport happen to be 
in the ascendancy can be implemented at a flick o f an order-in-council.
That may be progress. . . .  75
In moving to an assessment of the proposed power to issue 
directions to the regulatory agencies, it is important to recall that 
this is to be an entirely unilateral power requiring no participation or 
consultation whatsoever. As Mr. Horner put it “The governor in 
council can change the policy with a flick of a switch . . . ” As a 
matter of practice, there may well be participation and consult ation 
but this will be entirely at the discretion of the Minister and Go rer- 
nor in Council. Even should there be such unstructured input, it will 
not constitute an adequate substitute for the requisite statutory 
guarantees, for this is too important a matter to be left out of the 
legislation itself.
A direction power, exercised from on high, does not take into 
account the manner in which regulatory policy must most often be 
formulated. Such policy seldom springs ftilly formed from the brow of 
Jove - it is most often the product of experience based on trial and 
error and an understanding of the front line realities of the regulatory 
process. Moreover, as K.C. Davis has noted, . .  the least difficult 
method for overall policy-making is through focusing on one particu­
lar facet at a time.” 76
75 Ibid., p. 3531. Mr. Nowlan pointed out that there had been five ministers of 
transport since 1968. Mr. Hellyer to April, 1969; Mr. Richardson as acting-min- 
ister until May, 1969; Mr. Jamieson from May, 1969 to November, 1972; Mr. 
Marchand from 1972 to 1975 and Mr. Lang from September, 1975. “On the 
other side o f the coin” , there had only been two chairmen of the C.T.C., Mr. 
Pickersgill and the present incumbent, Mr. Benson. “This shows that by its very 
make-up the C.T.C. will in an apolitical, non-perjorative way bring a little more 
continuity to policy making than the ever-changing revolving musical chairs 
necessitated by cabinet appointments.” Ibid., p. 3712.
76 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 1970 Supplement, supra, note 58, p. 12.
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William L. Cary, drawing on his experience of three and a half 
years as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, has 
warned that it would be most unwise to withdraw the responsibility for 
the development of policy through rule-making entirely from a 
regulatory agency.
Further, in my opinion, the interaction of informal administrative 
decisions, formal cases and rule making is both fruitful and necessary. The 
vast bulk of S.E.C. work . . .  consists o f processing ... gist ration statements, 
periodic reports, proxy solicitation material, applications for exemptions, 
and requests for advisory letters under the various acts ii administers.
These activities are administrative in nature (and) enriches our experience 
perhaps as much as litigated cases. Without concrete examples, policy 
formulation might become more sterile and unrealistic. It is not easy to 
make policy in a vacuum. In the words o f Mark S. Massel of the Brookings 
Institution: ‘‘Policy formulation is a never-ending process. It calls for feed­
back of ideas and information coming from the administration of existing 
policies. New problems arise which cannot be foreseen when rules are 
developed. As conditions change they may require changes in policy.” 77
The need for such front line regulatory experience in the formu­
lation of policy has been borne out in the only sustained experience 
of the use of a direction power in Canada. As authorized under 
section 22(1) (iii) of the Broadcasting Act, the Govemor-in-Council 
issued a direction on foreign ownership of Canadian broadcasting 
undertakings. A series of amendments had then to be adopted 
because it was found that ownership practices did not fall into the 
preconceived notions put into the original direction. This might well 
not have been necessary had the directions themselves grown out of 
the regulatory experience and not been imposed from above.
It would be useful to consider one practical example drawn 
from the C.T.C. study. 78 Over the last several years there has been 
substantial discussion as to the need for a policy on “ third level 
carriers” similar in nature to the present Regional Airline Policy. 
But who is going to formulate this policy? The C.T.C.’s Air Trans­
port Committee has a good deal of practical experience with the 
actual workings of the third level carriers and has already started to 
develop such a policy, although the Committee Chairman, in an 
interview, expressed grave reservations as to the practicability at the 
present time of a general policy statement, in view of the extra­
ordinarily wide discrepancies of geography and carrier capability. 
Moreover, as he pointed out, there isn’t any agreed upon definition 
of “ third level” carrier (or “ primary” carrier, as some prefer to be 
called). It seems obvious that any policy, if it is going to be at all 
realistic, will have to draw heavily on the Committee’s practical
77 Cary, Politics and the Regulatory Agencies, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Com 
pany, 1%7, p. 128.
78 Agency Study, pp. 122-123.
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experience. It will also have to draw on the sense of urgency and 
desire to break away from ad hoc case by case adjudication which 
characterizes the Ministry. To formulate the policy in the abstract 
and then to seek to force the Committee to implement it will not 
work because those with practical experience in enforcement and 
administration must have confidence in the practicability of the 
policy they are called on to implement.
Considerations such as these might be seen as favouring a com­
plete rejection of any power to formulate policy outside of the regu­
latory agency itself. However, experience of regulation in Canada 
does not support this extreme solution because, as already noted, 
independence must remain only a relative concept particularly in a 
parliamentary system of government and our regulatory agencies 
have all too often failed to articulate policy preferring case by case 
adjudication to policy statements and rulemaking. The challenge is 
to devise a technique which will require the regulatory agency to 
formulate policy, not simply to impose it from above as presently 
proposed.
Not only is no provision made in Bills C-33 and C-43 for 
involvement of the regulatory agencies in devising directions, but 
there is, as well, no provision for industry or public involvement. The 
rationale would seem to be that accountability and not participation 
is what counts. Directions will be the clear product of the Governor 
in Council and the government will be immediately answerable to 
parliament and in the long run to the electorate. Representative or 
indirect democracy has been favoured over participatory or direct 
democracy.
While the resultant clarity of responsibility should be 
welcomed, and is certainly to be preferred to the present system 
which can lead to indirect, under the table influence without 
political accountability, it does not suffice by itself. How effective, in 
practice, will this accountability be in helping to create sensible 
regulation? Its inherent weakness is that it can only provide an ex 
post facto check at which stage there will be a natural tendency for 
the government to defend its position to the hilt and to see criticism 
as being directed against it and not against a particular policy. 
Moreover any change in policy will be seen as an admission of a 
mistake to be firmly resisted. In other words, ultimate accountabil­
ity, important as it is, is no substitute for openess in policy making 
which allows fro the interplay of competing ideas before any final 
position is adopted.
Policy direction which are not the product of an open system 
will inevitably be damned as favouring those who have the ear of the 
government. “Might not trial by agency with all its blemishes,” K.C. 
Davis has warned, “ take on a new beauty in the eyes of those who
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have gazed upon the ugly countenance of trial by lobbyists?” 79 
Before rejecting this as an example of American hyperbole, consider 
again the pay television example at the start of this paper. For a 
minister to announce a new policy, which would replace the policy 
position of the regulatory agency arrived at after detailed public 
hearings, at the trade convention of the industry most likely to bene­
fit from such change, is hardly calculated to reassure one of even 
handed regulation.
As well, as John Langford noted in his study of the creation of 
the Ministry of Transport, the ministry planning and policy making 
process has apparently been insulated from inputs which do not 
emanate from organized traditional interest groups.
Transportation policy making at the federal level has always been charac­
terized by an extremely close relationship between the transportation 
industry and its interest groups, and the bureaucracies o f the various 
agencies involved in the policy-making process. There are indications that 
the centralization of policy making, coordination and control within the
portfolio has facilitated the access o f industry to the process----- The
prevailing definition of responsiveness lays no emphasis whatsoever on its 
relevance to the direct demands of the general public served by the national 
transportation system, unless these demands are filtered through Cabinet 
and the minister and then aggregated into ministerial priorities.80
Lack of any opportunity for participation is all the more 
striking in the Telecommunications Bill, C-43. In Canada we have 
not adopted a general requirement for an opportunity to participate 
in regulation making as in the Administrative Procedure Act in the 
United States. However, the Broadcasting Act provides that the 
C.R.T.C. is not to adopt a regulation without publishing it in the 
Canada Gazette and providing a reasonable opportunity for 
licensees and other interested persons “ . . .  to make representations 
with respect thereto.” 81 This approach has been continued in the 
Telecommunications Bill, and it calls attention sharply to the lack of 
any similar provision with respect to directions.
Despite an avowed commitment to greater accountability in the 
regulatory process, no attempt has been made in either Bill C-33 or 
Bill C-43 to require that regulations made by the C.T.C. or the 
C.R.T.C. be subject to the approval of the Governor in Council. Both 
the McRuer Commission,82 and the MacGuigan Report,81 urged
79 Davis, Administrative Law' Treatise, 1970 Supplement, supra, note 58, p. 12.
80 Langford, Transport in Transition, supra, note 35, pp. 208-9.
81 s. 16(2).
82 Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, Toronto, Queen’s Printer, Volume 1, 
pp. 359-60.
83 Third Report o f  the Special Committee on Statutory Instruments, Ottawa, 
Queen’s Printer for Canada, 1969, pp. 34-5.
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that all regulations of a substantial policy nature should always be 
subject to government approval in the interests of political responsi­
bility. It is particularly difficult to understand why regulations have 
not been made subject to approval when the breadth of the regula­
tion making power is recalled. For example, under the Aeronautics 
A ct4 84 the C.T.C. has very wide powers to make regulations covering 
many facets of air transportation. Indeed, Ernest Saunders, a very 
experienced participant in regulatory matters, has singled out the 
Aeronautics Act as an example of an overly broad grant of delegated 
power.85
This omission would appear to mean that all the government 
wants is an opportunity to second1 guess the regulatory agencies 
rather than to take any real, continuing responsibility for the work­
ing of the regulatory process as a whole. If  it is genuinely concerned 
about accountability, it should be prepared to stand behind the 
widespread regulation making power of regulatory agencies by 
requiring that all such regulations have its approval. Not only would 
such a step be correct from the point of view of principle, but as a 
matter of practical politics it would seem extremely unwise to seek to 
knock out a regulation made after a public hearing with a direction 
which can so easily be ridiculed as a Czarist ukase. However, as 
regulations will not require approval, although they often deal with 
major policy matters, such a spectacle would appear inevitable.
Much has been made of the fact that the Governor in Council 
will not be entitled to issue directions to the C.T.C. or C.R.T.C. with 
respect to any matter already before them. It is difficult to under­
stand this concern that there be no interference in the “judicial” 
aspects of commission work in view of the open-ended power of the 
Governor in Council not only to reverse decisons but also to substi­
tute its own decisons for those of the commission. It may well be that 
a party would be less ill-treated if, at the outset of his application, 
the rules of the game are changed by a direction rather than, after 
going through a commission hearing, he has a favourable decision 
reversed by the Governor in Council on the basis of new policy 
considerations not argued before the regulatory agency,86
84 R.S.C. 1970, c.A-3, s.14.
85 Telecommunications Regulation at the Crossroads, Dalhousie Continuing Legal 
Education Series No. 13, H.N. Janisch (ed.), Halifax, 1976, pp. 76-7.
86 A classic example o f changing the rules after a decision has already been made 
by the regulatory agency is to be found in the Bell case in 1973. ‘‘In its initial 
determination in the 1973 Bell rate application the Telecommunications Com­
mittee [of the C.T.C.] applied the wellknown rate base rate o f return regulatory 
tests. However, on review, it was told that social factors should have been used in 
addition to the traditional tests___ If the government had wished the Committee
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It is often very difficult to see the important issues clearly 
enough to lay down policy until concrete cases arise. The Edwards 
Committee in the United Kingdom made a useful proposal in this 
regard. “ If, for example, the department wished to change policy 
radically in the light of a particular case, this might be done by 
empowering the Minister by statute to issue a direction suspending 
the Authority’s [the regulatory agency] decision for a specific (but 
not unduly long) period on the grounds of major public interest. 
Within that period the department would have to table, and if neces­
sary defend to Parliament, a change in the statutory instrument set­
ting out the civil aviation policy.” 87
Finally, it might be well to clarify the exact legal status of 
directions as there is at the moment considerable confusion at the 
federal level as to what exactly is meant by a “ statutory instrum ent” 
and a “ regulation” , let alone a “direction” . 88
VII. CONCLUSION
The time has now come for the critic to pay his price of admis­
sion and put forward his own positive proposals. If this paper has 
done nothing else, it will at least have shown the need for a much 
more extensive public debate on the role of independent regulatory 
agencies in Canada than there has been up to this point. In order to 
further that debate, this paper will conclude with a number of spe­
cific proposals which contrast sharply with those contained in Bills 
C-33 and C-43. Overstatement and lack of precision should be 
excused in the interests of getting a clear set of alternatives out into 
the open.
to take such factors into account, it could have instructed counsel to appear and 
raise these issues. Its concern could have been formally communicated to the 
Committee at the hearing in order to ensure that the hearing be conducted on the 
right basis." Agency Study, pp. 117-121. For a more general discussion of the un­
desirability o f reversing decisions on grounds not developed before the regulatory 
agency, see, ibid., pp. 116-117.
87 British A ir Transport in the Seventies, Report o f the Committee o f Inquiry into 
Civil Air Transport, 1969, Cmnd. 4018, pp. 253-4. For an interesting analysis of 
events leading up to the establishment o f the Civil Aviation Authority see Ganz, 
"Allocation of Decision-M aking Functions” , 1972 P.L. 215 at 224-9. For an im ­
portant decision on the legal status o f "guidance” issued to the C. A.A., see Laker 
Airways v. Department o f Trade, [1977] 2 W .L.R. 234 (C.A.).
88 See the Second Report o f the Standing Joint Committee o f the Senate and o f the 
House of Commons on Regulations and Other Statutory Instruments, 30th Pari., 
3rd Sess., 1976-77. For a recent most unsatisfactory decision on the legal status 
of the “directives” of the Commissioner o f Penitentiaries by the Supreme Court 
of Canada, see Martineau and Butters v. M atsqui Institution Inmate Disciplinary 
Board, 1977 55 D.L.R. (3d) 1. And see H.N. Janisch, case comment 55 C.B.R. 576.
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The following are the premises on which the proposals are 
based:
1. Regulation must be recognized as political in the sense that 
it involves choices between competing social and economic values.
.2. To be effective regulation has to be credible and this 
requires open procedures.
3. The basic policy framework of regulation should be con­
tained in the statute.
4. In practice this still leaves considerable scope for on-going 
policy making.
5. A major responsibility for policy making rests with the 
regulatory agencies which should make full use of their rulemaking 
powers.
6. Ultimate responsibility for policy rests with the elected 
officials whose views must prevail but in such a way as not to com­
promise the credibility of the regulatory process.
Specific proposals are as follows:
1. Before a direction is issued to a regulatory agency, that 
agency should be given an opportunity to participate in policy 
formulation.
2. Provision should be made for public participation in direc­
tion making.
3. Proposals 1 and 2 can be most readily met as follows: Prior 
to the issuance of a direction, the matter involved shall be referred to 
the commission which shall hold public hearings on the matter and 
make a report to be laid before Parliament within sixty days of its 
receipt.
4. The Governor in Council will not be bound by the report 
and will be entitled to make an entirely independent decision 
although it will not be able to ignore the report as it will be made 
public. This procedure would blend together the three crucial 
elements - regulatory experience, public participation and political 
accountability.
5. Provision should be made for a “ stop order” on any appli­
cation which raises substantial unresolved policy issues.
6. Regulations of the regulatory agencies should be subject to 
the approval of the Governor in Council.
7. Since the government will now have the means at its dis­
posal to take the initiative in policy making, there will be no need for 
appeals to, or review by, the Governor in Council.
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This proposal will not be pleasing to the provinces who appear 
to want a government to government policy making mechanism. Nor 
will it be welcomed by the federal departments which would have to 
appear at commission public hearings to explain their policy prefer­
ences and even, possibly, be subject to cross-examination. The ear of 
the minister is always to be preferred to a public hearing. Yet deals 
made behind closed doors and announced by preemptory directions 
hardly seem likely to inspire confidence in the regulatory process. 
Indeed, one probable result of the inherently Draconian nature of 
the direction power will be that it will be very sparingly employed 
and the present policy vacuums which exist in so many areas of regu­
lation will continue indefinitely. Alternatively, it will be held in 
reserve as a club over the regulatory agencies, and this will lead to all 
sorts of indirect influences with the agencies being tempted to guess 
at ministerial policy preferences. In the final analysis, in a democra­
tic society, if a policy is to be credible, it must be the product of a 
credible process.
